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Bureau of Reclamation recently
announced that its prime mission since
1902-building dams to make the desert
bloom in the American West-is pretty
much complete. While never really admitting that its newer projects have been
economically infeasible, Bureau management has at last recognized that the days
of the big public water project are gone.
The Bureau now plans to turn its attention
and resources to other more pressing
problems, such as helping other agencies
with construction projects needed to cope
with hazardous waste.
But getting the Bureau out of the dambuilding business goes only part of the
way toward solving some critical economic problems. For the Bureau policies have
left a legacy-irrigation projects that supp Iy water lo farmers at subsidized
prices-that will continue to impose costs
on society greater than the benefits they
provide. It is now time to take some steps
also to bring those costs and benefits
more into line.

Benefits Less Than Costs
Subsidized irrigation projects impose
costs on society far greater than most
people realize. The problem is not just
that the Bureau of Reclamation spends
hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars
each year to supply water to farmers at
"low" prices. If that money were merely
transferred from taxpayers to farmers,
there may be little net efficiency loss. But,
in actual fact, subsidized reclamation projects squander valuable capital and environmental resources by benefitting farmers far less than taxpayers pay.
We can illustrate this point with numbers representative of the San Joaquin
Valley in California. Here the Bureau's
Central Valley Project supplies irrigation
water. Roughly, the Bureau's separable
costs for irrigation ( i.e., construction and
operation and maintenance (OGM) costs
identified only with irrigation use) for the
newer projects amount to between $300
to $500 per acre-foot of waler delivered
when appropriate interest charges on the
original capital investment are included.
For this water, the typical farmer repays
the government less than $20 per acrefoot, some far less. In many cases, even
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the OGM costs ranging from $5 to $9,
exceed what farmers pay. This situation
was perhaps the principal motivation for
the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982
which increased water prices to those irrigators who do not meet the operatedacreage size requirement of 960 acres.
Studies show that the value of water to
farmers in the San Joaquin Valley averages about $50 per acre-foot. Thus, on
average, the farmer captures a net benefit
of approximately $30 per acre-foot delivered. Let us be conservative and assume
that such water costs the taxpayers $300
per acre-foot. Therefore, to supply this
$30 of net benefit to the irrigators, taxpayers have forked out a net $280 ($300
less the $20 farmer repayment to the government.). Most of this "subsidy" has
been sunk into physical capital (i.e ., darns
and canals) that cannot be economically
recovered, however.
Some contend that construction of irri gation facilities helps the local economy,
so that the loss is not entirely "deadweight" from the viewpoint of the nation
as a whole. We doubt this
contention. While some
local gains in employment and output result
from the building and
operating of dams and
canals, resources generally utilized are simply
transferred from other
localities where they
would have created similar benefits had the water
project not been built.

Why Returns
Are Low
One might inquire as
to why irrigation water,
for which taxpayers pay

so dearly, is of such relatively "small"
value to farmers? But what is small? The
value of water in irrigation Is small: (I)
relative to the full costs of supplying the
water, and (2) relative to the value of
water in most urban uses. Irrigated agriculture uses water intensively and grow-

Subsidized reclamation
projects squander
valuable capital
and environmental
resources.
ing irrigated crops (or any other for that
matter) is just not very profitable these
days.
But irrigation water is not even so valuable as it might be because of government
policy. In order to limit the per-farmer subsidy for equity rea sons, the 1902
Reclamation Act
restricted
the
amount of land per
qualified recipient
of subsidized water
to a maximum ·of
160 acres. A 1926
amendment interpreted the act to
mean 320 acres
for a husband and
wife farming together. Farmers,
however, were permitted to expand
their actual operated acreage beyond 320 acres by
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leasing land from other owners who also
qualified to receive subsidized water. In
this way, farmers could profit from scale
economies (such as larger machinery)
that have become available in the post
World War II period.
In 1982, however, the law was changed
to increase the maximum acreage that
could receive subsidized water to 960
acres, but the limit was applied to leased
as well as owned land . Any water put on
land which exceeded the limitation would
be available only at "full cost" rather than
at the subsidized price. Full cost would
include a charge for capital investment
but, for irrigation, interest charges have
been waived. Since the subsidy has been
so large, the effect is that the full-cost
waler could be priced at a much higher
rate than : the subsidiied price. The likelihood is g~eat that the impact of the 1982
Act will be to reduce the size of many California fa~ms and thus to raise costs of
production .
Extensive controversy exists over
whether the original 320-acre restrictions
were adequately enforced, especially in
areas of California where farms are very
large . The important point here is that
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water will almost certainly be worth less
to farmers now that there appear to be
restrictions on ils t1se that prevent the
most efficient farm size and structure.

Some People Made Wealthy
Despite acreage limitations that were
designed to limit the water subsidy, pricing water below its value has created considerable wealth for a certain class of
recipient irrigalors. Even a relatively small
net benefit, such as $30 per acre-foot, will
push up land prices sharply. A typical
contract with the Bureau of Reclamation
might provide three acre -feet of water per
acre per year for 40 years . As soon as the
contract is signed , land is likely to
increase in value in excess of $1500 an
acre. By providing three acre-feet of water
a year, the contract allows each acre of
land to return an additional $90 a year in
net benefits for 40 years. Assuming an
interest rate of 5 percent, the present
value of that flow of net benefits is $1544.
It is also expected that contracts will be
renewed when the current one expires at
terms not far different than those under
the initial contract. This means that the

present value of expected future net benefits will be substantial and they will be
quickly reflected in the land price. Therefore, the principal beneficiaries of pricing
water below its value are the owners of
the land al the time the irrigation project
begins lo deliver water. Subsequent purchasers of land must pay market prices in
order lo receive entitlement to subsidized
waler and thus their wealth gains from the
subsidy are much more limited.
In sum, most reclamation projects have
provided far less farmer net benefits than
they have cost the taxpayers, and they
have made a few people suddenly
wealthy. It might be good public policy
now to correct some of these inefficiencies and inequities . But how?

Some Options
One way to make existing reclamation
projects, such as the Central Valley Pro
ject in California and the Columbia Basin
Project in Washington, more equitable to
taxpayers would be to raise the price of
water to its true full cost. This is a policy
commonly advocated by environmental
organizations. Unfortunately, for projects
0
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constructed, this
cy makes little ecomic sense. Priced lo
-ne farmer at $300 per
acre-foot, water would be
far more expensive than it
would be worth under any
conceivable irrigation
regime. Water simply
would go unused-and
even the $50 of waler
value and $30 worth of
net benefits that currently
exist would be lost.
Sadly, taxpayers must
realize that sunk costs in
the form of dams and
canals that represent the
bulk of the irrigation subsidy simply are gone forever. They have been the
consequence of uneconomic political decisions
that gave us premature
and infeasible projects. Of
course, we can make
sure that uneconomic
new projects will never be
built by insisting that new water be priced al full cost. Who would
want new water at a price of $300 per acre - foot and worth only
$50?
A more feasible way to improve pricing on existing projects
would be to renegotiate the price of waler when contrncts come
up for renewal every 40 years or so . In fact, the contract period
could also be shortened. The price should be set at the marketclearing level-the price at whi c h all water available could be
sold-so long as this price covers the O[,M costs of the project
(something approximating the average variable costs.)
Through time, the price
could be tied lo a suitable
price index that would
reflect aggregate price
level movements . Thus,
inflation could not reduce
the real water price over
the period of the water
contract as now occurs.
Our view of the relevant
facts would suggest that
the market-clearing real
price would be well below
the full cost of the water
for existing projects , but in
most cases would be
higher than prices now
drnrged.
If we are correct in this judgment, this pricing approach might
place a burden on some farmers already reeling under heavy
debts . Raising the price of water will cause land prices to fall, just
as underpricing it caused land prices to rise. Many farms have
changed hands since underpriced waler was first delivered, and
the current owners paid for the expected net benefits in the form
of higher-priced land as illustrated above. These land owners will
lose wealth if water prices go up.
There probably is another alternative that would at once be
more equitable to current land owners than simply raising the
repayment price and it would be more allocatively efficient al the
same time. Current water allocations could be converted into firm

Sunk costs in the
fonn of da,ns and
canals that
represent the bulk
of tile irrigation
subsidy si,nply
are gone forever.
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and permanent property
rights and issued to existing irrigators. We recom mend that the owner of
these rights to water be
permitted to market them
without restriction so long
as other existing rights
are not thereby impaired.
These market exchanges
would occur at whatever
prices the buyer and seller would find mutually
attractive.
The obligation to the
government. builder of the
project could be handled
in several ways. At a minimum, the right holder
should be obligated to
reimburse the federal
government for project
O[,M costs in order lo
insure that further taxpayer losses be avoided.
If it were deemed politically expedient that the
taxpayers should receive
an even larger share of the economic rents available from the
transfer, this could be legally rnandaled . To reduce the institutionc1I risk of changes in policy that would impede otherwise feasible
transfers, it would seem important for all negotiating parties to
know in advance what the government would take off the top.
By allowing farmers to sell water at a profit, if they wished, a
mechanism would be provided for transferring waler to those who
value it most. In some cases, farmers might sell tlieir excess
water to municipalities or other types of urban and recreational
users. Even instream rec reational and transport users might buy
sufficient rights lo guarantee minimum stream flows that they
deem desirable.
In nearly every region of the West, agriculture is the marginal
user of waler in the sense that waler is more valuable in other
uses. For this reason, the primary sellers of waler in a free market
would likely be existing irrigalors .
Some of the buyers might be urban water users that are looking
for ways Lo augment existing and future supplies. As transfers
from agriculture to urban uses occur, water prices in the two sectors would move closer to equality.
Because the consumptive use of agriculture usually exceeds 80
percent of the total water usage in most Western stales, a lot of
waler could be transferred to urban and industrial uses without
significantly threc1tening agricultural viability. In addition, if farmers could transfer waler at free market prices, they would have a
strong incentive to economize on their waler consumption by
employing a wide variety of available conservation practices. In a
water market, the true opportunity cost of waler is what it would
be worth in its best alternative use, which would include its transfer value. For these reasons, if water markets existed, it is not
obvious lo us that the size of the agricultural sector in most areas
would be diminished at all.
Yes, the Bureau is off to a good slart by implicitly acknowledging that costly new projects are politically infeasible. But reforrn in
the rules and regulations for pricing and allocating existing water
is also badly needed.
Irrigation waler should be viewed like any other agricultural
input and we should rely on market forces to govern its price and
allocation . Substantial increases in societal wealth would be the
result.
~
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